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Abstract 
It is a known fact as to how intricately interwoven 
electronic forms of communication and electronic media 
are in all aspects of life in the 21st century, including 
governance, crime and justice. This is widely recognised, 
and our reliance on technology is only bound to increase. 
Yet, development in legal literature does not occur 
synchronously. Where the pace of technology  increases 
with time, legal developments that should ideally be 
concomitant, fall behind and often cause confusion, not 
only among the parties to the dispute in question, but also 
to lower Courts that seek to apply such principles in the 
future. One such nobly motivated legislative development 
is the 65B Certificate, the legal position with regard to 
which has seen multiple alternating views on the question 
of its mandatory nature with the latest developments 
delivered by the Supreme Court in the judgments of Shafhi 
Muhammad (2018) and Arjun Khotkar (2020). This paper 
discusses the changes that regulations dealing with the 
authentication of electronic evidence have undergone, post 
the introduction of the Section, analyses probable causes of 
the same and concludes with the contention that the 
current position of law may be inadequate.  
                                                          
⁎ National Law University, Jodhpur, India; singh.bhavyakirti@gmail.com 
┼ National Law University, Jodhpur, India; bambaditya@gmail.com 
 




Keywords: Admissibility, Authenticity, E-Commerce, Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872,   Information Technology Act, 2000 
1. Introduction 
This paper seeks to address the gap created by the progressive 
growth in technology and the struggle faced by the Courts while 
evaluating the credibility of evidence presented in complex forms, 
which may not be ordinarily interpreted. The first part of the paper 
elaborates upon the interpretation of electronic evidence as 
contemplated by the Information Technology Act, 2000 [IT Act, 
2000] read with the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Evidence Act, 1872]. 
Subsequently, it analyses the circumstances which led to the 
introduction of Section 65B of the Act and its legal context. The paper 
then thoroughly examines the scope of the provision and the 
requisite procedure of authentication to obtain the certificate. It then 
engages in a case-law analysis relating to the admissibility of 
electronic evidence under Section 65B of the Act which reveals a 
conflict in position with regard to the requirement of a certificate. 
The paper then critically analyses the Supreme Court’s judgments in 
the Shafhi Muhammad and Arjun Khotkar cases.1 Finally, the paper 
recommends certain changes to the existing position of law with 
respect to the admissibility of electronic evidence in consonance with 
changes in technology, as well as with the practicalities of the Indian 
Courtroom. 
2. Electronic Evidence in India 
In principle, electronic evidence means “information of probative 
value that is stored or transmitted in binary form”2 or “information 
                                                          
1 Shafhi Muhammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2018 SC 714; Arjun 
Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao & Ors. [Civil Appeal Nos. 20825-
26 of 2017, decided on 14/07.2020]. 
2 Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging Technology, 
Best practices for digital evidence laboratory programs glossary; See 
Carrie Morgan Whitcomb, An Historical Perspective of Digital Evidence: A 
Forensic Scientist’s View, 1(1) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE,  




stored or transmitted in binary form that may be relied on in Court.”3 
However, it must be noted that while such a general definition may 
be useful for educational purposes, it fails to clarify and pinpoint as 
to the exact constitution of electronic evidence. For the purposes of 
clarity and precision, the authors first discuss the interplay of 
provisions under the IT Act, 2000 and the Evidence Act, 1872.  
Section 2(1)(t) of the IT Act, 2000 defines ‘electronic record’ as “data, 
record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in 
an electronic form or micro film or computer-generated micro 
fiche”.4 Further, Section 2(1)(r) of the IT Act, 2000 interprets 
‘electronic form’ as any “information generated, sent, received or 
stored in media, magnetic, optical, computer memory, micro film, 
computer generated micro fiche or similar device”.5 Simply put, an 
electronic record requires information to be stored, received or sent 
in an electronic form.6 However, any electronic record cannot be 
admitted into a Court of law merely on the basis of its electronic 
form. Section 4 of the IT Act, 2000 provides legal recognition to such 
electronic record on the cumulative satisfaction of two conditions:  
i. That it is rendered or made available in an electronic form, 
and,  
ii. That it is accessible so as to be usable for a subsequent 
reference.7 
                                                          
https://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/publications/articles/
9C4E695B-0B78-1059-3432402909E27BB4.pdf. 
3 International Organization on Computer Evidence, G8; BUKHARD 
SCHAFER & STEPHEN MASON, THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE, in MASON S. & SENG D. (EDS.), ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 18-35 
(2017) [hereinafter “SCHAFER AND MASON”]. 
4 § 2(1)(t), Information Technology Act, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 
(India). 
5 § 2(1)(r), Information Technology Act, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 
(India). 
6 Arvind M. Bhandarwar, Electronic Record, Its Proof and Certificate under 
Section 65B of Indian Evidence Act [hereinafter “Bhandarwar], 
http://mja.gov.in/Site/Upload/GR/%20ELectronic%20Record.pdf. 
7 § 4, Information Technology Act, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India). 




Consequently, the question arises as to whether on the satisfaction 
of these two conditions, the electronic evidence in question becomes 
relevant and a judge is duty-bound to appreciate it. As shall be 
observed later, the nature of electronic evidence is such that mere 
compliance with the two-fold test under Section 4 of the IT Act, 2000 
does not make it relevant from an evidentiary perspective. The rules 
of relevance and admissibility are determined by the Act. Therefore, 
this brings us to Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, 1872, 
which aid in determining the relevance of electronic evidence in 
India.   
3. Legislative History of Section 65B 
In 1965, Gordon E. Moore, the Intel co-founder, made an interesting 
observation with regard to the growth of transistors on integrated 
circuits.8 He asserted that technological growth is not linear but 
exponential.9 He did not realize that this simple observation would 
turn into a law governing the growth of technology, economy and 
social change for more than half a century subsequently.10 However, 
constant change is a consequence of exponential growth.11 Therefore, 
due to the exponential growth in usage and development of 
technology, coupled with the advent of the internet, it becomes 
necessary to deal with the issue of electronic evidence and make 
changes to the legal regime that had existed prior to such changes. It 
is fairly obvious that for the drafters of the Evidence Act, 1872, the 
innovations of technology and computers, emails or communication 
through social media platforms were unfathomable. Therefore, the 
initial framework of the Act reflected a traditional approach to 
documentary evidence in the form of paper records. 
                                                          




10 Max Roser and Hannah Ritchie, Technological Progress, https:// 
ourworldindata.org/technological-progress. 
11 DANIEL W. GRAHAM, HERACLITUS, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2019 ed.), https:// 
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/heraclitus/. 




However, this does not imply that after the proliferation of the 
computer and other technological equipments,12 the functioning of 
the Courts came to a standstill with respect to matters concerning 
electronic evidence. On the contrary, in 1996, an amendment was 
made to the Companies Act, 1956,13 which dealt with the 
admissibility of certain types of electronic evidence. Further, there 
are several instances where the Courts have admitted electronic 
evidence,14 most popularly in the RK Malkani case.15 In essence, the 
Courts treated electronic evidence as secondary evidence under 
Section 63 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It would be presented in the 
form of transcripts or a printed reproduction and certified by a 
competent signatory to verify authenticity.16 Subsequently, the 
signatory would identify their signature in Court and could be cross-
examined.17 The entire process was drawn out and could be easily 
exploited due to the absence of sufficient safeguards for checking the 
authenticity of the digital evidence. Nevertheless, the Courts were 
obligated to apply the traditional framework to these cases which 
generated inconsistencies and uncertainty due to the analogous 
approach.18 This brought about an increased reliance upon judicial 
discretion by the judges who were unsure as to the extent to which 
the traditional approach could cover such cases, thereby leading to 
                                                          
12 See, World Without Borders: E-mail and Cyberchat are Revolutionizing the 
Way We Live, The Week, at 12 (1999). 
13 § 610 A, Companies Act, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India). 
14 Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 147; Yahoo! 
Inc v. Akash Arora, 78 (1999) DLT 285; Aradhya Sethia, Rethinking 
Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 24(3) INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 229 (2016) 
[hereinafter “Sethia”]. 
15 RK Malkani v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 15. 
16 Tejas Karia, Akhil Anand & Bahaar Dhawan, The Supreme Court of India 
re-defines admissibility of electronic evidence in India, 12 DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 33-37. See also, Bhairav Acharya, 
Anvar v. Basheer and the New (Old) Law of Electronic Evidence, https://cis-
india.org/internet-governance/blog/anvar-v-basheer-new-old-law-of-
electronic-evidence.  
17 Id.  
18 SCHAFER & MASON, supra note 3. 




contradictions and confusion. The fundamental rules governing the 
law of evidence appeared to be at risk.  
These factors prompted the need for a change in the framework, 
which could adequately address contemporary needs in the form of 
electronic transactions. Thus, this translated into legislative action in 
the form of an amendment to the Evidence Act, 1872 by virtue of the 
IT Act, 2000 coming into force.19 The amendment was based on the 
guidelines given by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], which recognized the 
growing complications that every nation faced with respect to the 
admissibility of digital evidence.20 The amendment modified the 
interpretation clause, i.e., Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872, to 
include electronic evidence within the ambit of documentary 
evidence.21 Further, it facilitated the introduction of Section 65A and 
Section 65B as special provisions to govern the admissibility of 
electronic evidence, the importance of which has not been 
overlooked by Courts in India.22  
4. Section 65B: Scope and Certification 
Trustworthiness is built on the foundation of two qualitative 
dimensions, namely, reliability and authenticity.23 The authenticity 
of a digital document is a test checking whether the document is, in 
fact, what it claims to be.24 A third parameter of integrity indicates 
                                                          
19 Entry 9, Schedule II, Information Technology Act, No. 21, Acts of 
Parliament, 2000 (India). 
20 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, UNGA Res 51/162, 16 
December, 1996, www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-
89450_Ebook.pdf.  
21 § 3(2), Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 
22 Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178; State (NCT of 
Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Mohd. Ajmal Mohammad 
Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1. 
23 STEPHEN MASON AND ALLISON STANFIELD, AUTHENTICATING ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE 193–260 (2017) [hereinafter “MASON AND STANFIELD”]. 
24 HEATHER MACNEIL, TRUSTING RECORDS: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND 
DIPLOMATIC PERSPECTIVES (2000); LIVIA IACOVINO, RECORDKEEPING, 




the soundness of the data in terms of its completeness and the extent 
of damage caused to it, if any.25 Further, this test is a pre-condition 
to the goal of admissibility.26 The differences between a physical 
document and a digital document confers a special status on the 
admissibility of electronic evidence as ‘digital data is inherently 
malleable or mutable.’27 This implies that it may be highly exposed 
to alteration, corruption, and/or damage which poses an 
appreciable risk to the admissibility of such data. Section 65B, along 
with Section 65A, was introduced as a safeguard to effectively 
counter the above-mentioned issues and to come to grips with the 
change in technology. The raison d’être of Section 65A seems to be to 
merely refer to Section 65B.28 The scope of the Section extends to 
criminal as well as civil proceedings, thus displaying the need for 
extensive analysis to understand its implications in the Indian 
context. 
Section 65B, through sub-Section (1), begins with a non-obstante 
clause,29 implying that the provision is applicable, irrespective of a 
contrary provision within the Act and will have an overriding effect 
in case of a conflict.30 It states that any information contained in an 
electronic record that is transferred to paper or generated through a 
computer output in the form of CDs, USBs, etc. shall be admissible 
in a Court of law if it satisfies the conditions stipulated by Section 
65B as regards the information and the computer output. It can be 
observed that sub-Section (1) has two functions. Firstly, it operates 
                                                          
ETHICS AND LAW 41 (2006), as cited in MASON AND STANFIELD, supra note 
23. 
25 MASON AND STANFIELD, supra note 23. 
26 Daniel K B Seng, Computer output as evidence, SING JLS 161–3;  MASON AND 
STANFIELD, supra note 23. 
27 Steven W. Teppler, Testable Reliability: A Modernized Approach to ESI 
Admissibility, 12 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 217, https://avemarialaw-law-
review.avemarialaw.edu/Content/articles/v12i2.Teppler.pdf.  
28 § 65A, Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 
29 § 65B (1), Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 
30 Great Western Rly. Co. v. Swіndon & Cheltenham Extensіon Rly. Co., 
(1884) 9 AC 787, 808; Pannalal Bansіlal Patіl v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 
AІR 1996 SC 1023.  




as a deeming provision which treats information contained in an 
electronic record as a document for the purpose of interpretation.31 
Secondly, it functions like an enabling provision creating an 
exception to the ‘best evidence’ rule,32 thereby, allowing the 
admissibility of secondary documents even in the presence of 
original evidence.33 As mentioned earlier, there are certain riders 
that must be satisfied in order to make the electronic evidence 
admissible under sub-section (1). Section 65B, through sub-section 
(2) explicitly lays down certain qualifications to ensure that the 
output is accurate and that computers are used lawfully, in 
accordance with the daily activities of business or otherwise.34 The 
conditions are mandatory and must be read in conjunction to ensure 
the accuracy and reliability of data. However, we are yet to see 
whether these conditions do, in fact, guarantee the authenticity, 
reliability and integrity of the data. Further, it is pertinent to note 
that the sub-section does not explicitly prohibit the alteration of data, 
although it may be inferred from the purpose of the provision. 
Furthermore, Section 65B(2) must be read with Section 65B(3) which 
interprets the nature of computer used with respect to the number 
of computers used to process or store data.35  
Section 65B(4) has been the most controversial when it comes to  
academic as well as legal discussions about the admissibility of 
electronic evidence. Section 65B(4) mandates the production of a 
certificate in order to provide a statement with respect to the 
electronic evidence.36 The certificate may/shall contain information 
with respect to the (a) identification of electronic record and the 
manner in which it was produced. Further, information related to 
                                                          
31 § 65B (1), Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 
32 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOLUME 17 138 (4th ed.); RATANLAL AND 
DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF EVIDENCE, (23rd Ed); Bank of India v. Ahbhoy 
Mohammed, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 91; Ashwini Vaidialingam, 
Authenticating Electronic Evidence: Sec. 65B, Indian Evidence Act 1872, 8 
NUJS L. REV. 43 (2015) [hereinafter, “Vaidiyalingam”]. 
33 § 65B (1), Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 
34 § 65B (2), Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 
35 § 65B (3), Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 
36 § 65B (4), Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 




the (b) specifications or characteristics of the device used for the 
production of the electronic record to show that it was produced by 
a computer. Additionally, the above-mentioned information 
disclosed in the certificate should be (c) signed by a person in a 
‘responsible official position in relation to the operation of the 
relevant device or the management of the relevant activities’ to the 
best of his knowledge or belief. It can be observed that Section 
65B(4), via a certificate, operates as one of the ways to satisfy the 
conditions of Section 65B(2). However, the point of contention is 
with respect to whether a certificate is a mandatory requirement for 
the admissibility of electronic evidence. Further, there is debate as to 
the sufficiency or ability of a certificate to ensure reliability of data.37 
Additionally, the language of Section 65B(4) indicates that the 
conditions (a), (b), and (c) are mandatory and must be cumulatively 
satisfied in order for the certificate to be valid.38 The requirement 
under (c) of sub-section (4) is unclear with respect to who can be a 
signatory and give a statement in relation to the certificate. The 
ambiguous wording of the Section has long confused the various 
stakeholders involved and has been the subject of fierce debate. 
It could be said that Section 65B is archaic in nature due to its 
overwhelming resemblance to Section 5 of the Civil Evidence Act, 
which came into effect in the year 1968 in the United Kingdom.39 In 
fact, the requirements under sub-section (2) of Section 65B are 
strikingly similar to Section 5(2) of the Civil Evidence Act, 1968. 
Further, the requirement of a certificate and the conditions 
stipulated under sub-section (4) mirror those given under the UK 
legislation. The perplexity of these observations is heightened when 
it is noted that the Civil Evidence Act had been repealed in the year 
1995 which is five years prior to the induction of Section 65B into the 
Indian legal system. This paper advocates a purposive approach, 
acknowledging the context in which the provision was implemented 
as well as the objective that it seeks to attain. 
                                                          
37 Sethia, supra note 14. 
38 On the contrary, See Jagdeo Singh v. State, MANU/DE/0376/2015, 2015 
CRI L.J. 3976 S.C.; Anvar PV v PK Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473. 
39 Civil Evidence Act, Chapter 64, § 5, Acts of Parliament, (UK)(1872).PO 




4.1 Process of Certification 
Regardless of whether the requirement of a certificate is mandatory 
or not, it is important to determine the stage at which the certificate 
is to be produced or who is qualified to be a signatory. With respect 
to the author of the certificate, the third condition encapsulated 
under (c) of sub-Section (4) of Section 65B is relevant and lays down 
the onus on the party, for presenting the electronic evidence. 
According to the provision, as mentioned above, the signatory to the 
certificate must be ‘occupying a responsible official position in 
relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management 
of the relevant activities.’ Additionally, the person must have 
adequate knowledge with respect to the functioning of the device.40 
The mandatory requirement of this provision can affect the interests 
of an innocent party, wherein the person occupying the responsible 
position refuses to be a signatory to the certificate, as the evidence 
might be detrimental to his interests. In such a situation, it becomes 
impossible for the party to produce a certificate. On the other hand, 
the provision was implemented with a view to prevent the alteration 
of data and ensure its accuracy, integrity and reliability.  
Another important aspect of Section 65B is with respect to the  time 
at which the certificate is to be obtained by the party seeking to admit 
the electronic evidence concerned. It must be noted that the entirety 
of Section 65B, including sub-section (4), does not, explicitly or 
implicitly, mention the time at which the certificate is to be obtained. 
The Supreme Court in the Anvar case¸ declared that the certificate is 
to be obtained at the time of producing the document.41 Therefore, 
even valid and authentic electronic evidence produced prior to 
obtaining a certificate was held to be inadmissible. Nevertheless, the 
position of law with this respect is still unclear due to conflicting 
High Court judgments which came subsequent to Anvar.42 
                                                          
40 Jagdeo Singh v. State, 2015 CRI L.J. 3976.  
41 Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473. 
42 Ankur Chawla v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 
MANU/DE/2923/2014; SK Saini v CBI, MANU/DE/2441/2015, Sethia, 
supra note 14,  in favour of the position in Anvar. Kundan Singh v. State, 




5. Section 65B and the Courts 
The Supreme Court first discussed 65B certificates in a landmark 
judgment in the Parliament Attack or Navjot Sandhu case;43 specifically 
in the context of call record printouts. The Court, with regard to the 
admissibility and reliability of such duplicate evidence, decreed that 
the non-filing of a 65B certificate would not lead to a conclusion of 
non-admissibility of secondary evidence. In such a situation, 
circumstances mentioned in other applicable provisions must be 
considered. Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 sets out 
‘Secondary Evidence’ to mean and include copies of the original, 
through a mechanical process that ensures accuracy and Section 65 
of the same enables such evidence to be adduced in the absence of 
the original. Further, with regard to the cross-examination of 
witnesses for this evidence, the Court relied on a House of Lords 
case,44 to reject an argument for the production of a technical witness 
acquainted with the functioning of computers. It was held that: 
printouts taken from the computers/servers by mechanical 
process and certified by a responsible official of the service 
providing Company can be led into evidence through a witness 
who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer or 
otherwise speak about the facts based on his personal 
knowledge.45 
Thus, the Court here allowed officials of the concerned companies to 
depose to the fact that the secondary evidence in the form of call 
record printouts was obtained from their computer records,46 
justifying the same by commenting on the ‘fair’ familiarity of the 
witnesses with the computer system and output. The Court placed 
an additional burden on the prosecution to call a technical expert 
                                                          
2015 SCC OnLine Del 13647, Paras Jain v. State of Rajasthan, 
MANU/RH/1150/2015, state a contrary position.  
43 State of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600. 
44 R v. Shepard, 1993 AC 380 (U.K.).  
45 ¶ 15, State of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600. 
46 US, Rule 1001(3), U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence (1972). 




directly in the know of things, in case a specific suggestion 
regarding, say, fabrication of the said evidence was brought up. 
Navjot Sandhu was followed by Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (Anvar),47 
which overruled the former. The Court in this case, has clearly stated 
that the Act has not permitted proof of an electronic or digital record 
through oral evidence and testimony if the requirements under 
Section 65B have not been complied with. The genuineness of the 
record would only come into question post compliance with and due 
production of the record as per 65B, for which one could resort to 
Section 45A, i.e., opinion of examiner of electronic evidence.  
The Court also prescribes the provisions of the IT Act, 2000, Section 
65A, Section 59 and Section 65A as a complete code in itself with 
regard to evidence relating to electronic records. Reversing the 
understanding of the same in Navjot Sandhu, the Court held that the 
general law as under Section 63 and 65 would have to yield to this 
special law, and thus have no application in cases of secondary 
evidence which are in the form of an electronic record. The same 
would be ‘wholly governed’ by Sections 65A and 65B. To 
summarise: 
An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be 
admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 
65B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the 
same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 
65B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, 
the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is 
inadmissible.48 
The Court has also drawn a distinction between the production of 
primary and secondary electronic evidence. Where primary 
evidence is adduced, for example, CDs that have been duly seized 
by the police or any other authorised agency, the same may be 
produced and played before the Court to verify the veracity. On the 
other hand, where they have been transferred from other 
instruments into a computer, thus going through multiple stages of 
                                                          
47 Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473. 
48 ¶ 22, Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473. 




transfer, and CDs have been made therefrom, they may not be 
produced in front of the Court without due certification. Though the 
principle here is appropriate, the Court may have used an 
inadequate or perhaps even inappropriate example to elucidate 
upon the same. Data storage records would only be primary 
evidence where the recording has been made on a device which 
directly stored the information, such as CD, hard drive etc. The 
Court concludes by reiterating that “if an electronic record as such is 
used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, 
1872, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance of the 
conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act, 1872.”49  Another 
instance where the Court does lightly misinterpret the provision is 
in its mention of conditions under Section 65B(4). Where the Section 
specifically mentions that ‘any’ of the conditions may be met, the 
judgment has overlooked the term and erringly presented the 
conditions as ‘and’ conditions. This is significant as the Court has 
gone on to further discuss that such safeguards have been taken to 
ensure that the two hallmarks of electronic evidence, i.e., source and 
authenticity remain intact and unperturbed. Yet, in the case Sonu v. 
State of Haryana,50 the Court proceeded to avoid the application of 
decision of the court in Anvar by misinterpreting a contention with 
regard to the inadmissibility of electronic evidence in the absence of 
a 65B Certificate. The argument in itself was dismissed in view of the 
Court’s application of procedural estoppel, stating that this objection 
should have been taken only at the trial stage and the same may not 
be contended at an appellate stage in view of the non-existence of a 
circumstance of inherent inadmissibility of said electronic evidence. 
In a situation to the contrary, non-objection at during trial would not 
lead to rejection of the contention at an appellate level. The Court 
relied on cases discussing irregularities in the mode of proof, 
concluding that the same may not be discussed during the final 
appeal hearings.51 Thus, where the Court avoided the question of 
whether or not a 65B certificate is mandatory for admissibility of 
                                                          
49 ¶ 24, Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473. 
50 Sonu Amar v. State of Haryana, MANU/SCOR/14605/2013. 
51 Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji, AIR 1943 PC 83. 




electronic evidence in Court, it allowed presentation of the same in 
this case against a procedural misstep on part of the appellants.  
6. Shafhi Mohammad and Section 65B  
One of the latest cases that falls into disrepute for a faulty 
interpretation of precedent, as well as a flawed application of 
principles under Section 65B is Shafhi Muhammad v. State of Himachal 
Pradesh.52 While answering questions with regard to admissibility of 
videography of the scene of the crime or scene of recovery during 
investigation, the Court relaxed the mandate of certification as 
established by the Court in the case of Anvar.  
Referring to multiple decisions of the Court,53 it was concluded that 
the threshold of the admissibility of electronic evidence could not be 
ruled out on technicalities if the same is relevant, though the 
reliability may be subsequently determined on the basis of facts and 
circumstances. 54 In  contrast, electronic and digital evidence would 
be admissible regardless of whether certification has been provided 
in cases where the person producing such evidence is not in a 
position to furnish the certificate owing to non-possession of the 
device. Sections 65A and 65B were held to be mere procedural 
additions provided as clarifications, thus starkly differing from the 
opinion of the Court in Anvar which had held these provisions to be 
a complete code on the subject.  
This judgment may be appreciated for its implicit impact on the 
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. The Court reasoned that 
it would be wrong to deny a party the benefits of accurate 
technology in cases where such evidence may be relevant on the 
grounds of non-production of the certificate. There may be situations 
where the electronic evidence is being provided by a person who is 
not in control of the said device and is thus not in a position to 
                                                          
52 Shafhi Muhammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2018 SC 714. 
53 Ram Singh and Ors. v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 (Supp.) SCC 611; Tukaram 
S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 178; R v. Maqsud Ali 
(1965) 2 All ER 464 and R v. Robson, (1972) 2 All ER 699. 
54 ¶ 6, Shafhi Muhammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2018 SC 714. 




produce such certificate owing to lack of fulfilment of conditions 
under Section 65B(4). To prevent such relevant material from being 
kept out of consideration, the evidence may be considered 
admissible by not completely excluding the application of Sections 
63 and 65 in situations where a certificate cannot be secured. This 
interpretation resolves the problems with regard to admissibility of 
illegally obtained evidence in Court and brings it at par with non-
electronic evidence, thus excluding the application of the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine across all forms of evidence in the country as 
it ought to be.   
But the Court further went on to expand the scope of Section 65B by 
stating that the requirement of the certificate is merely procedural 
and may be relaxed wherever interest of justice so requires,55 
exposing the process of the Court to possible abuse on account of 
instances of false and fabricated evidence.56 As compared to physical 
evidence such as handwriting, it would be tougher in manifolds for 
a Court to check the veracity of electronic evidence. A certification 
would be helpful in attesting to the fact that the evidence is unaltered 
and unerring before it is admitted bearing in mind the various stages 
of transfer it undergoes before being presented before the Court in 
form of evidence. Furthermore, with all due respect, the Apex Court 
of the country, instead of clarifying the position of law ensuring 
certainty and uniformity, relied on the phrase ‘wherever interest of 
justice so requires’ casting a doubt on the applicability of Section 65B 
as a whole. The Court did not lay down any specific guidelines 
elucidating the situations in which a certificate could be done away 
with. The authors of this paper understand that each case is 
accompanied with a unique set of facts and circumstances, however, 
using an abstract phrase without stipulating specific guidelines does 
not seem like a practical solution. In effect, this shifts the duty of 
clarifying, whether a certificate is required or not, on the sub-
ordinate courts without the presence of effective guidelines on the 
interpretation of Section 65B. 
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7. Arjun Khotkar and Section 65B Today 
The debate and confusion regarding the nuances of application of 
Section 65B prompted the Supreme Court to refer this question to a 
larger bench in view of the increasing dependence upon electronic 
evidence during investigations.57 Herein, the Supreme Court 
explicitly reinstated the validity of Anvar findings, declaring Shafhi 
as per incuriam. The Court sought to secure a clear delineation 
between the provisions under Sections 65A and 65B, as opposed to 
the rest of Chapter V, which had been held to be inapplicable in 
concluding the admissibility of electronic evidence. The Bench 
emphasized upon the mandatory character of the certificate, which, 
though is unnecessary in case of the availability of the original 
document or device, is a pre-requisite for admissibility where one 
cannot produce the same. In rejecting the premise of Shafhi with 
regard to incapability of production where one is not in possession 
of a device, the Court clarified that a relevant application may be 
made before a Judge to direct production of the certificate or device 
from another concerned person, emerging from the general power 
of a magistrate to issue summons.  
Additionally, the Court also made general directions to 
intermediaries, including cellular companies and internet service 
providers under Section 39 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 67C 
of the IT Act, 2000, to retain relevant records for a certain period 
where associated Call Detail Records or devices are seized during 
investigation. Further recommendations were also made to frame 
rules under Section 67C for data retention by intermediary 
companies. While this may be appreciated as an obvious and correct 
identification of relevant provisions and case law by the Court, it 
once again falls short of clarifying uncertain nuances in the 
determination of admissibility that arose in cases such as Sonu, 
thereby opening to interpretation issues such as the non-application 
at the ‘appropriate’ stage and its implications on the trial process.  
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Further, its direct and emphatic overruling of Shafhi also raises 
certain questions – would information stored on devices that are 
irretrievable, for instance, destroyed, lost or where the applicant is 
unaware of the location, be inadmissible? This would especially be 
the case where the lock-in period of the information with the 
intermediary has elapsed. What would be the consequences where 
the applicant can produce copies of the relevant document without 
certification in absence of the original device? 
8. Looking Ahead  
An implicit recognition of the lacuna in the Arjun Khotkar judgment 
is sufficiently clear through the recommendations for formation of 
rules with no judicial direction in the fashion of Vishakha v. State of 
Rajasthan (Vishakha)58. For instance, the judgment in Visakha 
contained specific and elaborate guidelines formulated for the 
prevention of sexual harassment of women in workplaces. In fact, it 
is viewed as a milestone in feminist jurisprudence which eventually 
to the enactment of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. However, while 
the Court in Arjun Khotkar recognized the need for judicial guidance, 
it failed to elaborate upon such guidelines which, in our view, are 
necessary for the purposive interpretation of Section 65B. 
Additionally, although there was a discussion on the modern trends 
in the treatment of electronic evidence in relation to foreign 
jurisdictions, the Court did not make any effort to apply or deliberate 
upon the impact of these observations specifically in the Indian 
context. In the interim, the authors of this paper have recommended 
certain changes to the existing position of law in consonance with 
the objective of the provision in addition to the context in which it 
was implemented.  
It must be noted that the Shafhi case referred to the Anvar judgment 
and then stated a position of law that is contradictory and 
irreconcilable with the one stated in Anvar without overruling the 
same. Additionally, the promulgation of Arjun Khotkar law leads to 
an absurd result which is irrational and does not fall in line with the 
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aim of Section 65B. To summarize, in accordance with the position 
after Shafhi, the Courts can make an exception to the requirement of 
a certificate in any case which requires their intervention in the 
‘interest of justice’. However, in a case where the certificate is 
deemed to be required, the position in Anvar would have to be 
followed and therefore, a party would have to satisfy all 
requirements under Section 65B(4), where the certificate has to be 
obtained at the time of producing the document.59 Further, Section 
65B(4) becomes the only way to satisfy the requirements under 
Section 65B(2). The difference in the standard of admissibility in the 
two situations is of pertinence. On the one hand, if a certificate is not 
required, a party escapes the onerous requirements of Section 65B(4) 
and has a considerably lower threshold for admissibility. 
Conversely, if a certificate is required, a party faces the burdensome 
task of mandatorily complying with all the requirements under 
Section 65B(4) resulting in a much higher threshold for admissibility. 
This is even more baffling when it is noted that the emergence of this 
disparity would come down to judicial discretion. Naturally, a 
balance must be sought between the two situations without relying 
on vague exceptions which lead to the exacerbation of existing 
problems associated with the admissibility of electronic evidence.  
Yet, the position after Arjun Khotkar is linear for situations discussed 
by the Court. Where the original device is produced, a certificate is 
not required. However, where the original device cannot be 
produced before the Court, a certificate must mandatorily be filed 
for the admissibility of relevant evidence at the earliest stage of trial, 
so as not to cause prejudice to the accused. In consequence, a post-
dated certificate would not be valid. The inadequacy of the judgment 
to answer all necessary questions, as well as of the archaic Section 
65B itself, so as not to leave uncertainties, has been recognised in a 
separate opinion by Ramasubramanian J., who draws parallels with 
the evolving jurisprudence in other common law countries, and 
encourages an approach cognisant of modern technology. Thus, the 
authors of this paper have made certain suggestions to modify the 
prevailing position of law to appropriately balance the disparities 
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and absurdities created by the interpretation of existing case laws on 
the subject. 
9. Reforming the law  
Due to the increasing relevance of electronic evidence in the legal 
scenario and the rise of e-commerce, it is necessary to have a suitable 
provision addressing all the concerns mentioned above. There has to 
be a balance between the availability and admissibility of electronic 
evidence and its susceptibility to manipulation due to its inherently 
malleable nature.  
Section 65B was introduced via an amendment to the IT Act, 2000, to 
deal with electronic evidence. The circumstances in which it was 
enacted in addition to the language of the Section which uses the 
phrase ‘special provisions’ can only indicate that the provisions were 
meant to be exhaustive and an exclusive application of the 
provisions was intended. An absence of a Statement of Object or 
policy discussions precludes a comprehensive analysis of the aim. 
However, the inherent and patent differences between electronic 
evidence and traditional evidence calls for differential treatment.60 
Therefore, the first recommendation is to treat Sections 65A, 65B 
read with Section 59 as a special code meant to exclusively deal with 
electronic evidence, which has, fortunately been accepted in Arjun 
Khotkar.  
Due to the exponential growth of technology, it is clear that 
subordinate Courts, which handle majority of such matters in India, 
would not be equipped with the latest technology or the know-how 
required to deal with such matters. Therefore, Section 65B(4) 
mandated a certification process which made an enquiry as to the 
nature of the technology used and the manner in which it was 
produced. It addresses important questions relating to the integrity 
of the data as well as the consistency with which information was 
recorded by the system. The certificate is the least a party can obtain 
to produce electronic evidence which can warrant authenticity and 
reliability. Additional methods to prove authenticity may be 
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required in certain cases and will be discussed later. However, a 
certificate under Section 65B(4) must be mandatory for the 
production of electronic evidence because it provides a foundation 
on the basis of which the evidence can be evaluated. Further, it 
promotes certainty and uniformity without excessively relying on 
judicial discretion. Hence, the second recommendation is to make 
the certificate a mandatory requirement for the admissibility of 
electronic evidence under Section 65B.  
In the Shafhi case, the Court recognized that there are situations when 
the requirements under sub-section (4) of Section 65B cannot be 
satisfied resulting in inadmissibility of electronic evidence due to 
lack of a certificate. This observation was nullified in Arjun Khotkar. 
Further, this paper recognizes the high threshold that is set by sub-
section (4) in terms of the time at which it must be obtained, and the 
position of the person qualified to be the author of the certificate. In 
lieu of the above observations coupled with the earlier 
recommendation of making the certificate mandatory, a relaxation 
of the conditions set under sub-section (4) seems appropriate. 
Therefore, it is recommended that firstly, the contemporaneous 
certificate requirement mandating its production during evidence is 
not required and must be waived. Secondly, an exception must be 
created to the rule requiring mandatory certification to 
accommodate illegally obtained evidence. In situations where the 
person is not in operation of the device; an exception must be 
created. However, the ambit of this exception must not be wide 
enough to encourage false evidence.61 Therefore, it should be 
restricted to accommodate illegally obtained evidence.  
Further, even though the requirement of a 65B certificate as a rule 
may be justified, it would still not hold true or adequate as 
conclusive proof in every circumstance. With the advancement of 
technology and its multifaceted features, authentication through a 
certificate may fall short of the aim of its institution and inclusion 
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within the rules of evidence. Apart from the obvious legislative 
introductions within the content of the certificate to make it more all-
encompassing (e.g., addendums to ensure non-presentation of false 
and fabricated evidence, tampering with the evidence during the 
investigation process etc.),62 it would also be fruitful to make 
provisions for the Court to be able to procure additional evidence. 
Authentication methods such as expert evidence should be 
encouraged. The Evidence Act, 1872 has provided for an Examiner 
of Electronic Evidence,63 but frequent solicitation of opinion from 
independent authenticators and private experts may also be 
promoted so that evidence can be verified. A thorough corroboration 
of the evidence is also necessary as the general scepticism with 
regard to the use of digital evidence flows from the ease of the 
possibility of its manipulation. It would thus also be helpful if the 
certificate provided for something akin to an audit trail.64 
The U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence also allowS for authentication 
through public records and metadata, apart from oral testimony 
which has also been provided in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.65 
Comparison with other authenticated evidence, similar to the 
functioning of Section 73 can also be functional.66 Even 
circumstantial evidence, which is one of the most frequently used 
rules of digital authentication, especially for social media authorship 
authentication in the US, may be taken into consideration. Detailed 
guidelines for the same may be developed on the basis of case law.67 
                                                          
62 DAC Janet Williams QPM, The U.K. ACPO (Association of Chief Police 
Officers) Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence, Version 5, ASSOCIATION OF 
CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS, (October, 2011), https://www.digital-
detective.net/digital-forensics 
documents/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf. 
63 § 45A Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). 
64 ACPO Guidelines, supra note 59, § 2.1.3. 
65 Vaidialingam, supra note 32; Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 901, 902 
(U.S.)(2015). 
66 United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006). 
67 HON. PAUL W. GRIMM, GREGORY P. JOSEPH, ESQ., DANIEL J. CAPRA, BEST 
PRACTICES FOR AUTHENTICATING DIGITAL EVIDENCE 9 (2016) [hereinafter 
“GRIMM ET. AL.”]. 




There may be an extensive amount of information that has not been 
elaborated upon adequately through the details mentioned on the 
certificate. In these cases, expert evidence and opinion that provides 
essential information may be more valuable before a Court. The 
general practice of relying upon provisions such as Sections 22A and 
45A of the Act independent of the certificate would also be helpful 
while dealing with cases that fall within the exceptions Section 65B. 
This may also be beneficial in anticipation of better methods of 
authentication,68 where oral testimony of experts can build upon the 
basic information provided through the certificate in cases where the 
certificate has been furnished.   
In addition, it is also suggested that certain general standard 
exceptions to the rule of authentication of digital evidence, or self-
authenticating digital documents be culled out.69 Some obvious 
inclusions would be official government websites and documents 
uploaded thereon. Public documents filed on record have a certain 
presumptive value of genuineness, 70 and it would not be a far stretch 
to ascribe such presumptive value to, say, forms filled online or 
authenticated documents uploaded on official websites and 
presented before the Court as printouts or otherwise.71 We may 
apply the same principle for other online resources such as official 
websites of newspapers, magazines, periodicals, other journals etc., 
businesses with certain financial or other records on websites, results 
of examinations (Universities or other Educational Institutions/All 
India Examinations), diagnostic centres or laboratories that make 
results available online etc. Since the information disseminated 
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therein flows mostly from the administrator of the said website, 
third-party tampering is less likely. In any case, self-authenticity is 
also bound to be a rebuttable presumption. This would also serve 
another purpose, i.e., to reduce the effort or cost that may have to be 
ascribed to authentication. Therefore, self-authentication offers a 
suitable solution to the onerous burden imposed by the certificate 
and is especially useful in the cases mentioned above. 
10. Conclusion 
In a world which is increasingly dependent on evolving forms of 
technology to facilitate communication, business, travel, etc. it is 
critical for the legal system to grow and adapt to the changes around. 
Further, the exponential growth of technology makes it 
progressively exigent to constantly reform the law and bring it in 
line with evolutionary technological innovations which could not be 
contemplated at the time of making the law. Therefore, in this 
technologically driven world, the rules governing electronic 
evidence assumes immense importance particularly due to the 
distinct nature of electronic evidence which makes it vulnerable to 
manipulation, alteration, damage, etcetera. 
Section 65B, formulated on the basis of UNCITRAL guidelines, was 
introduced to the Evidence Act, 1872 to govern the admissibility of 
electronic evidence in India. Though ambiguously worded and 
astonishingly similar to the provisions of a repealed Act in the UK, 
i.e. the Civil Evidence Act, 1968, the purpose of the provision must 
not be ignored. A separate provision in the form of Section 65B was 
crafted predominantly to check the manipulation of electronic 
evidence and consequently determine its admissibility. In the 
absence of the satisfaction of conditions under sub-section (2) and 
the certificate requirement under sub-section (4) of Section 65B, there 
exists no uniform alternative method to check the authenticity of 
electronic evidence in India. The Shafhi interpretation of Section 65A 
and Section 65B as mere procedural provisions by the Supreme 
Court proved inconsistent with the purpose of these provisions. A 
more detailed and fruitful analysis of the chronology of 
admissibility, relevance and certification of electronic evidence in 




consonance with Section 136 of the Act has been carried out in Arjun 
Khotkar, though it is not without its own shortcomings.  
This paper sought to make certain recommendations to alleviate this 
uncertainty and strike a fair balance between accommodating 
electronic evidence within the Courtroom and excluding it due to its 
vulnerability to manipulation. The authors argued that the 
requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) must be the rule 
with specific exceptions created to accommodate illegally obtained 
evidence, self-authenticating evidence, etc. The procedural 
requirements under Section 65B ensure a minimum level of 
authenticity which could be corroborated with additional evidence 
to establish greater reliability if deemed necessary by the 
circumstances of the case. However, as things stand, in a developing 
country rapidly moving towards digitalization, an incomplete 
interpretation and an application of Section 65B replete with lacunae 
can lead to adverse consequences for the justice system in India.  
